How Will QUIC Change Internet Communication?

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QUIC: a fast, secure, evolvable transport protocol for the Internet

- **Fast** better user experience than TCP/TLS for HTTP/2 and other content
- **Secure** always-encrypted end-to-end security, resist pervasive monitoring
- **Evolvable** prevent network from ossifying, deploy new QUIC versions quickly
- **Transport** support all TCP content & more (realtime media, etc.) provide better abstractions, avoid known TCP issues
The web will move to QUIC first, and then everything else will.

If you do anything with HTTP, TCP or just networks, QUIC should be on your radar now.

Affects the network and third parties, too.

- Always-encrypted, mostly obfuscated:
  - Need to control an endpoint to get a useful trace.
How do you make the web faster?


User-perceived latency

$BROWSER
HTTP/1.1
TLS 1.2
TCP
IP
Physical Network
google.com

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How do you make the web faster?


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$BROWSER
HTTP/1.1
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Physical Network

Build a carrier-grade network

Google CDN

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How do you make the web faster?


User-perceived latency

$BROWSER
HTTP/1.1
TLS 1.2
TCP
IP
Physical Network

Launch your own browser
Update HTTP

Build a carrier-grade network

Chrome
HTTP/2

Google CDN
google.com
google.com

Update HTTP
How do you make the web faster?

Internet transport
The Internet hourglass

Classical version

- Inspired by OSI “seven-layer” model
  - Minus presentation (6) and session (5)

- “IP on everything”
  - All link tech looks the same (approx.)

- **Transport layer** provides communication abstractions to apps
  - Unicast/multicast
  - Multiplexing
  - Streams/messages
  - Reliability (full/partial)
  - Flow/congestion control
  - …
The waist has split: **IPv4** and **IPv6**

**TCP** is drowning out **UDP**

**HTTP** and **TLS** are *de facto* part of transport

Consequence: **web apps** on IPv4/6
What happened?

- **Transport slow to evolve** (esp. TCP)
  - Fundamentally difficult problem

- **Network made assumptions** about what (TCP) traffic looked like & how it behaved

- Tried to “help” and “manage”
  - TCP “accelerators” & firewalls, DPI, NAT, etc.

- **The web happened**
  - Almost all content on HTTP(S)
  - Easier/cheaper to develop for & deploy on
  - Amplified by mobile & cloud
  - Baked-in client/server assumption
Example ossifications

- Send from/to anywhere anytime vs. enforced directionality & timeliness
- Many protocols on top of IP vs. packets dropped unless TCP or UDP
- End-to-end addressing vs. network assumes it can rewrite addresses/ports
- Use IP options to signal vs. options not used (dropped) on WAN
- Bits have meaning only inside a layer vs. network can (should!) touch bits across a packet
- Network is stateless vs. network assumes it can track entire connection
- Data has meaning to app only vs. network can rewrite or insert
TCP challenges
TCP is not aging well

- **We’re hitting hard limits** (e.g., TCP option space)
  - 40B total (15 * 4B - 20)
  - Used: SACK-OK (2), timestamp (10), window Scale (3), MSS (4)
  - Multipath needs 12, Fast-Open 6-18…

- **Incredibly difficult to evolve**, c.f. Multipath TCP
  - New TCP must look like old TCP, otherwise it gets dropped
  - TCP is already very complicated

- **Slow upgrade cycles** for new TCP stacks (kernel update required)
  - Better with more frequent update cycles on consumer OS
  - Still high-risk and invasive (reboot)

- **TCP headers not encrypted** or even authenticated – middleboxes can still meddle
  - TCP-MD5 and TCP-AO in practice only used for (some) BGP sessions
Middleboxes meddle

Example: TCP accelerators

Middleboxes meddle
Example: Nation states attacking end users or services

QUANTUM INSERT: racing the server

The Game:
- **Wait** for client to initiate new connection
- Observe server-to-client TCP SYN/ACK
- **Shoot**! (HTTP Payload)
- **Hope** to beat server-to-client HTTP Response

The Challenge:
- Can only win the race on some links/targets
- For many links/targets: too slow to win the race!
Pervasive monitoring is an attack

RFC 7528

- IETF (& wider) community consensus that pervasive monitoring is an attack
- Agreement to mitigate pervasive monitoring
- What does “mitigate” mean?
- To many, ”encrypt as much as possible”
QUIC

Selected aspects
QUIC is not *that* new, actually

- Originates with Google, deployed between Google services and Chrome since 2014
- Mid-2017, QUIC made up 35% of Google egress traffic (~7% of total Internet traffic)
- Early 2021, DE-CIX reported 20% QUIC on some links
- Early 2022, https://radar.cloudflare.com reports ~25% QUIC
QUIC in the stack

- Integrated transport stack on top of UDP
- Replaces TCP and some part of HTTP; reuses TLS-1.3
- Initial target application: HTTP/2
- Prediction: many others will follow

Why UDP?

- TCP hard to evolve
- Other protocols blocked by middleboxes (SCTP, etc.)
- **UDP is all we have left**
- Not without problems!
  - Many middleboxes ossified on “UDP is for DNS”
  - Enforce short binding timeouts, etc.
  - Short-term issue with hardware NIC offloading
- Also, benefits
  - Can deploy in userspace (no kernel update needed)
  - Can offer alternative transport types (partial reliability, etc.)
Why congestion control?

- Functional CC is **absolute requirement** for operation over real networks
  - UDP has no CC

- First approach: **take what works for TCP, apply to QUIC**

- Consequence: need
  - Segment/packet numbers
  - Acknowledgments (ACKs)
  - Round-trip time (RTT) estimators
  - etc.

- Not an area of large innovation at present
  - This will change
Why transport-layer security (TLS)?

- **End-to-end security is critical**
  - To protect users
  - To prevent network ossification

- **TLS is very widely used**
  - Can leverage all community R&D
  - Can leverage the PKI

- **Don’t want custom security** – too much to get wrong
  - Even TLS keeps having issues
  - But TLS 1.3 removes a lot of cruft

- And benefit from new TLS features
  - E.g., 0-RTT handshakes (inspired by gQUIC-crypto)
Why HTTP?

- Because that’s where the **impact** is
  - Web industry incredibly interested in improved UE and security
- Rapid update cycles for browsers, servers, CDNs, etc.
  - Can deploy and update QUIC quickly
- Many other app protocols will follow
Minimal network-visible header

- With QUIC, the network sees:
  - Packet **type** (partially obfuscated)
  - QUIC **version** (only in long packet header)
  - Destination **CID**
  - Packet **number** (obfuscated)

- With TCP, also
  - ACK numbers, ECN information
  - Timestamps
  - Windows & scale factors

- Also, entire QUIC header is **authenticated**, i.e., not modifiable
Version negotiation

(Currently under re-design)

- **32-bit version field**
  - IP: 8 bits, TCP: 0 bits

- **Allows rapid deployment of new versions**
  - Plus, vendor-proprietary versions

- **Very few protocol invariants**
  - Location and lengths of version and CIDs in LH
  - Location and lengths of CID in SH (if present)
  - Version negotiation server response
  - Etc. (details under discussion)

- **Everything else is version-dependent**
  - But must **grease** unused codepoints!
1-RTT vs. 0-RTT handshakes

- **QUIC client can send 0-RTT data in first packets**
  - Using new TLS 1.3 feature

- Except for very first contact between client and server
  - Requires 1-RTT handshake (same latency as TCP w/o TLS)

- **Huge latency win in many cases** (faster than TCP)
  - HTTPS: 7 messages
  - QUIC 1-RTT or TCP: 5 messages
  - QUIC 0-RTT: 2 messages

- Also helps with
  - Tolerating NAT re-bindings
  - Connection migration to different physical interface

- But only for **idempotent** data
Everything else is frames

- Inside the crypto payload, **QUIC carries a sequence of frames**
  - Encrypted = can change between versions
- Frames can come in **any order**
- Frames carry **control data and payload data**
- Payload data is carried in **STREAM frames**
  - Most other frames carry control data
- Packet acknowledgment blocks in **ACK frames**

- **PADDING**
- **PING**
- **ACK**
- **RESET_STREAM**
- **STOP_SENDING**
- **CRYPTO**
- **NEW_TOKEN**
- **STREAM**
- **MAX_DATA**
- **MAX_STREAM_DATA**
- **MAX_STREAMS**
- **DATA_BLOCKED**
- **STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED**
- **STREAMS_BLOCKED**
- **NEW_CONNECTION_ID**
- **RETIŔE_CONNECTION_ID**
- **PATH_CHALLENGE**
- **PATH_RESPONSE**
- **CONNECTION_CLOSE**
- **HANDSHAKE_DONE**
Stream multiplexing

- A QUIC **connection** multiplexes potentially many **streams**
  - Congestion control happens at the connection level
  - Connections are also flow controlled

- **Streams**
  - Carry units of application data
  - Can be uni- or bidirectional
  - Can be opened by client or server
  - Are flow controlled
  - Currently, always reliably transmitted (partial reliability coming soon)

- Number of open streams is negotiated over time (as are stream windows)

- Stream prioritization is up to application
Current status & discussions
QUIC is being standardized in the IETF
- QUIC is very different from Google QUIC
- RFCs published May 2021
- 20+ known implementation efforts:

QUIC is an IETF Working Group that is chartered to deliver the next transport protocol for the Internet.

See our contribution guidelines if you want to work with us.

Upcoming Meetings
We have scheduled an interim meeting in Zurich, on 5-6 February 2020. After that, will be meeting at IETF 107 in Vancouver.

- https://quicwg.github.io/
- https://quicdev.slack.com
### Interop status

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Also, automated interop testing via Docker containers and ns3 at https://interop.seemann.io/
Encryption vs. X

Network management

- Claims that network management systems rely on TCP header inspection
  - To obtain loss, RTT, etc. information
- Concern that encrypting this information will be troublesome for network operators
- Proposals for limited information exposure
  - e.g., the “spin bit”, the “loss bits”
- Uncertainties
  - Can networks trust this information?
  - Incentives for opting in? Penalties??

Measurement-informed Internet evolution

- Independent passive measurability of the Internet one key factor to success
- Many protocols deficiencies were identified and fixed based on independent measurements
  - Large area of academic work
- Are we giving up something fundamental here?
- Or are we at a point where active measurements have taken over anyway?
Before I go...
How to participate?

- QUIC WG is open to all
  - Use the mailing list
  - Discuss issues/PRs on GitHub
  - Participate in meetings

- [https://quicwg.org/](https://quicwg.org/) will get you started

- IETF is open to all
  - [free remote attendance!](https://quicwg.org/)

- 3x meetings/year, next:
  - Philadelphia, July 2022
  - London, November 2022
  - Asia, March 2023

- Grants for academics:
  - ACM/IRTF ANRW workshop (travel grants, only students)
  - IETF/IRTF Chair discretionary fund (need strong reason)

- You can talk to us first, too
- “Note Well” – disclose IPR

- Contact maintainers and start issues/PRs

- [https://quicwg.org/](https://quicwg.org/) links to a list of implementations
- Many are open source and live on GitHub